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TENTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETATIONS OF GARCETTI: LIMITS
ON FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR WHISTLE-

BLOWERS
INTRODUCTION

In May of 2006, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark
ruling in the case of Garcetti v. Ceballos,' which significantly restricted
the free speech protections of government employees.2 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the narrow majority 3 proclaimed, "when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. ' 4 The
Court concluded that although a government employee's speech may be
protected where the employee "speaks as a citizen addressing matters of
public concern,, 5 the dispositive analysis hinges on a balancing test involving a number of competing contextual factors surrounding the
speech. Just because a government employee has spoken on matters of
public concern does not guarantee First Amendment protection. In fact,
rulings by lower courts interpreting Garcetti have denied constitutional
protections even when speech by whistle-blowers involved credible allegations of government corruption,7 mismanagement,8 and illegality.9 In
cases where the speech occurs pursuant to a government employee's

1. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
2. Id. at 1960-61; see also John Sanchez, The Law of RetaliationAfter Burlington Northern
and Garcetti, 30 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOc. 539, 553-54 (2007) ("[T]he GarcettiCourt ruled that anything public employees say in the course of performing their assigned duties is not of public concern,
and is therefore not protected under the First Amendment"); Joel Gora, FirstAmendment Decisions
in the October 2005 Term, 22 TouRo L. REv. 917, 926 (2007) ("[S]peech at the public workplace
...may still be protected, but speech on the job is virtually immune from any First Amendment
inquiry").
3.
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts along with
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1954.
4.
Id. at 1960.
5. Id. at 1961.
6. Id.
7. Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a university
employee's retaliation claim that she was fired after reporting financial improprieties and possible
fraud involving her supervisor, failed under Garcetti because her complaints were made pursuant to
her official duties).
8. Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1331 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a school superintendant's retaliation claim that she was fired after reporting financial improprieties involving federal funding of the district's Head Start program, failed under Garcetti because
she reported the problems pursuant to official duties).
9. Williams v. Riley, 481 F. Supp. 2d 582, 583-84 (N.D. Miss. 2007) (explaining that three
police officers' retaliation claims that they were fired after reporting the beating of a restrained
prisoner by a fellow officer, failed under Garcetti because their complaints were made pursuant to
their official duties).
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official duties, the Court in Garcetti held that there is no First Amendment shield.10
Interestingly, the Court declined to provide a framework for determining when speech is pursuant to official duties. 1' Without a framework, the federal courts at both the trial and appellate levels have had to
break new ground in this area. 12 How a court construes speech pursuant
to official duties often determines whether an employee's speech is unprotected. 13 Predictably, different courts have taken different approaches
to this analysis.' 4 Problematically, some have interpreted the Court's
decision in Garcetti broadly, declaring more speech to be unprotected. 15
Others have interpreted Garcetti narrowly,
expanding the field of pro6
tected speech relative to other courts.'
17
The Tenth Circuit has provided guidance in this developing area
and follows the broader application of the Garcettitest.' 8 The impact has
been a substantial erosion of speech protections for government employees. Two opinions issued after Garcetti offered perhaps the most expansive interpretation of how speech pursuant to official duties should be
construed. In Green v. Board of County Commissioners,19 the appellate
panel barred First Amendment protection because the plaintiffs speech
involved generally "the type of activities [the employee] was paid to
do.",20 The Tenth Circuit drew a similar post-Garcetticonclusion in the
2007 case of Casey v. West Las Vegas Independent School District,21 in
which the appellate court found statements relating to matters within an
employee's "portfolio" of responsibilities to be "pursuant to her official
duties. 2 2 The Tenth Circuit's most recent refinement of Garcetti came
10.
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1962.
11.
Id. at 1961.
12.
See, e.g., Casey, 473 F.3d at 1328.
13.
See Sanchez, supra note 2, at 559-60.
14.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *1, * 11, *13, Spiegla v. Hull, No. 07-273, 2007 WL
2461589 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 2007) (explaining how different federal courts at the trial and appellate
levels have construed the official duty analysis of Garcettidifferently).
15.
See, e.g., Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11 th Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers,
468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006); Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2006).
16. Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Ctr., 451 F. Supp. 2d 905, 929 (2006) (indicating the
court "interprets Garcettimore narrowly ....
If the public employee's speech was required by his
or her job, then Garcetti applies and the statements are not protected speech. If the speech, however,
is not specifically job-related, then the statements are reviewed under a traditional Connick analysis"); see also Lindsey v. Orrick, 491 F.3d 892, 897-98 (8th Cir. 2007); Jackson v. Jimino, 506 F.
Supp. 2d 105, 109-10 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); Barclay v. Michalsky, 451 F. Supp. 2d 386, 394-99 (D.
Conn. 2006).
17. Cheek v. City of Edwardsville, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1230 (D. Kan. 2007) ("The Tenth
Circuit ... has provided significant guidance on this issue since Garcetti."); see also BrammerHoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007).
18. Brammer-Hoelter,492 F.3d at 1203-04; Charles W. Rhodes, Public Employee Speech
Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging DoctrinalFormalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 119596 (2007) (explaining the difference between narrow and broad applications of Garcetti).
19. 472 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2007).
20. Id. at 800-01.
21.
473 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 2007).
22. Id. at 1329.
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23
in the 2007 case of Brammer-Hoelterv. Twin Peaks CharterAcademy,
in which the appellate court said "speech relating to tasks within an employee's uncontested employment responsibilities is not protected from
regulation. 24

While the Tenth Circuit's use of the term "uncontested employment
responsibilities" to define official duties in Brammer-Hoelter seems to
slightly narrow the general guidelines offered in Green and Casey, the
analysis remains broad. Broad interpretations of official duties tend to
result in more restrictions to speech because more speech can be caught
in the wide net of expansive terminology. By broadly defining when
speech is pursuant to official duties, Brammer-Hoelter,Green, and Casey
arguably limit the First Amendment protections of government employees beyond even the Court's guidance in Garcetti. Thus, the Tenth Circuit's approach has important implications for whistle-blowers and practitioners.
Part I of this comment provides a brief history of the case law
through Garcetti including a description of the Garcetti razor 25 and its
consequences. Part II analyzes the Tenth Circuit cases that have interpreted Garcetti, and makes the argument that the Tenth Circuit has restricted free speech beyond the specific application used in Garcetti.
Part III compares the Tenth Circuit's approach to other circuits that have
interpreted Garcetti, looking specifically at how the jurisprudential
framework can be the most important dispositive factor. Finally, Part IV
discusses the impacts on whistle-blowers, citizens, and governments,
concluding with some thoughts for practitioners operating in a postGarcettilandscape.2 6
I. IT WASN'T ALWAYS THIS WAY

In simpler times, before Garcetti, the "unchallenged dogma 27 assumed government employers could use the employment relationship as
leverage to restrict an employee's First Amendment rights. 28 That prevalent attitude in the early twentieth century eventually yielded to a juris-

23.
492 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007).
24. Id.at 1203.
25. The Garcetti razor is a term invented by the author to describe the test that often blocks
public employee speech claims from the constitutional balancing test known as the ConnickPickering test.
26.
A common theme throughout this comment is the author's opinion that Garcetti is overly
broad, lacks predictability, and leaves too much speech unprotected.
27.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1957 (2006) ("[T]he unchallenged dogma was that a
public employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment-including
those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights." (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 143 (1983)).
28.
Rhodes, supra note 18, at 1176; see also id (quoting Justice Holmes that a policeman
"may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policemall").
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prudential approach that was more sympathetic to free speech. 29 This
change in philosophy evolved in the 1950s and 1960s through a string of
cases concerning government attempts to identify, blacklist, and retaliate
against former or suspected members of the communist party in America. 30 The cases struck down statutes and conduct aimed at restricting
government employees from exercising their rights to "participate in
public affairs., 3 1 The precedential seeds of those progressive cases would
bear 3 fruit
in the landmark 1968 case of Pickering v. Board of Educa2
tion.
A. The Pickering Balance Creates ConstitutionalProtectionsfor Public
Employees
The Pickeringcase expanded the speech rights of public employees,
providing some First Amendment protections to those whose speech
related to matters of public concern. In Pickering,the Board of Education [Board] fired a teacher for writing a "letter to the editor" in which
the teacher criticized the Board and superintendant for spending too
much money on athletics, and for attempting to bar teachers from publicly criticizing a bond issue. 33 The Court established a balancing test
weighing the interests of the public employee's speech against the government's interest in efficient administration of services. 4
The
Pickering Court held the teacher's speech interest prevailed because the
teacher spoke on matters of public concern, specifically taxes and elections.3- Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the exercise of the contested
speech had little impact on the orderly and efficient operation of the
school district.3 6 The Court also recognized that teachers are "most
likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to
the operations of the schools should be spent." 37 Thus, while the Court

did not view the speech of government employees as having absolute
constitutional protection, the Court was willing to extend that shield if
the employee's interest in speaking on matters of public concern outweighed the government's interest in quashing the speech.
The
Pickering test formed the modem basis for evaluating government retaliation claims, and remained largely unmodified until the 1983 case of
Connick v. Myers.38

29.
30.
31.

Id. at 1176-77.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 144.
Id. at 144-45.

32.

Id.; 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Pickering,391 U.S. at 566.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 570-73.
Id. at 572.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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B. Connick Makes Speech Retaliation Claims More Difficultfor Government Employees
In Connick, the Court added an obstacle to the traditional Pickering
test by requiring an antecedent analysis of whether the speech related to
matters of public concern. 39 That is, the new rule required a finding that
the speech constituted a matter of public concern before the courts could
employ the balancing test under Pickering.40 Prior to Connick, courts
generally skipped the public concern analysis and went straight to the
balancing test.
In Connick, an employee in the New Orleans District Attorney's Office, upset after being given a forced transfer, put together a questionnaire asking co-workers to share their views on issues, including confidence in management and employee morale.4 ' She passed out the questionnaires to co-workers. 42 Upon learning of the employee's "mini insurrection, ' 43 her bosses fired her for insubordination. 44 The question for
the Court involved assessing whether the plaintiff's speech was protected
under Pickering.45 The Court reasoned that the prerequisite hurdle to
Pickering is a public concern analysis. 46 That is, the public employee
must have spoken as a citizen on matters of public concern before the
Court would employ the Pickering test. 47 The Court concluded that the
content of the employee's questionnaire amounted to speech about the
employee's personal grievances. 48 In that capacity, the Court reasoned,
the employee was not speaking as a citizen on matters of public concern
and was therefore not entitled to constitutional protection from her employer's discipline. 49 Thus, Connick, as a limiting factor, gave judges a
filter to bar certain cases from ever getting to the Pickering balance.50
This effectively restricted the First Amendment protections of public
employees by limiting the claims that would survive a summary judgment challenge. 5 '
The combination of Pickering and Connick resulted in a four-step
analysis.52 First, did the public employee speak as a citizen on a matter
of public concern? 53 Second, if the employee spoke as a citizen on a
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Rhodes, supra note 18, at 1178.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
Id.at 140-41.
Id. at 141.
Characterization given by supervisor Dennis Waldron. Id.
Id.
Id. at 142-43.
Id.at 145-46.
Id.at 147-48.

48.

Id.at 154.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
See Sanchez, supra note 2, at 552.
Id.
Rhodes, supra note 18, at 1179-80.
Id.at 1179.
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matter of public concern, did the individual's speech interest outweigh
the government's interest in efficient administration? 54 Third, if the individual's speech interest outweighed the government's interest, did the
government commit a retaliatory employment action because of the employee's speech? 55 Fourth, even if the government retaliated against the
employee's speech, would the government have taken the same action if
the speech had not occurred? 56 For the adverse employment claim to be
actionable, the plaintiff must win each prong of the Connick-Pickering
test, whereas the government prevails if it can win at least one prong. 7
The Connick addition to the Pickeringtest made it very difficult for
public employees to have actionable claims when their speech triggered
employer retaliation. 8 The cases that typically survived the Connick
reformulation were those focusing on whistle-blowers whose speech
exposed government misconduct.59 The courts were generally more receptive of claims in which the employee had at least a partial motivation
to expose government
corruption, as opposed to primarily airing personal
60
grievances.
C. Along Comes Garcetti
The Connick-Pickering analysis would undergo another restrictive
reformulation in the landmark case of Garcetti v. Ceballos.61 In Garcetti, an assistant district attorney, Ceballos, wrote a memo to his superiors explaining that he believed a police search warrant contained key
misrepresentations.6 2 He recommended that the district attorney dismiss
the case.63 During a heated meeting, Ceballos' superiors and colleagues
"sharply criticized" his conclusions and ultimately ignored them. 64 Ceballos later claimed he had suffered retaliatory employment action culminating in his forced transfer and reassignment.65 He further alleged
that he had been passed over for a promotion in the aftermath of his
66
memo.

The Court, reasoning that his speech was made pursuant to his official duties, ultimately rejected Ceballos' retaliation claim.67 In short, he
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
Ceballos
65.
66.
67.

Id.
See id. at 1179-80.
Id. at 1180.
See id. at 1179-80.
See Sanchez, supra note 2, at 552.
Rhodes, supra note 18, at 1187.
Id.
126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
Id. at 1955-56.
Id
Id. at 1956 ("The meeting allegedly became heated, with one lieutenant sharply criticizing
for his handling of the case.").
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1960.
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would not have written the memo had his employer not required his
opinion on a pending case. 68 According to the narrow majority, restricting "speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have
enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer
control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created." 69
Consequently, the Court barred constitutional protection for Ceballos'
speech because he spoke pursuant to his official duties as a deputy district attorney.
D. The Garcetti Razor
The practical impact of Garcetti is that it created another hurdle for
claimants to overcome before courts can proceed with the ConnickPickeringanalysis.7 ° If the speech of a government employee is found to
be pursuant to official duties, then the rule in Garcetti acts as a razor,
cutting off the possibility of constitutional protection7 and preventing the
court from proceeding to the Connick-Pickeringtest. '
E. Implications of Garcetti
The fallout from the Court's ruling in Garcetti is significant in that
it further limits the kinds of retaliation claims that will survive a summary judgment challenge. 72 In the aftermath, even claims by whistleblowers documenting government misconduct and corruption have failed
under the threshold test of Garcetti.73 For example, in Battle v. Board of
Regents,74 the plaintiff Lillie Battle, a financial aid officer at a Georgia
university, was fired after she reported instances of alleged fraud and
mismanagement involving her supervisors handling of federal monies.75
Battle sued on a retaliation claim alleging her First Amendment rights
had been violated.7 6 Even though state and federal audits substantially
confirmed Battle's prior allegations regarding fraud and mismanagement, 77 the Eleventh Circuit held her speech to be unprotected. Interpreting Garcetti, the court found that because Battle's job duties included an
obligation to report fraud and misconduct, her whistle-blowing activities
fell within the scope of her official duties.78 According to the Eleventh
Circuit, Battle was not speaking as a private citizen under Garcetti,and
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
468 F.3d
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
See Sanchez, supra note 2, at 561.
Id.
See id. at 563.
See, e.g., Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11 th Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers,
528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006); Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2006).
468 F.3d 755.
Id. at 757-58.
Id.at 759.
Id.
Id. at 761-62.
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therefore her speech was not constitutionally protected. 79 Thus, if a court
concludes, as a matter of law, that the speech was made pursuant to an
employee's official duties, it receives no constitutional protections even
though the content of the speech may have been of great interest to the
public.
Anticipating the whistle-blower's dilemma, the dissent in Garcetti
criticized the majority's rigid pigeon-holing of job-related speech as being pursuant to official duties. 80 This is because once speech is construed
as "pursuant to ... official duties" it is categorically barred from being a
matter of public concern. 81 If the speech is not a matter of public concern then it warrants no First Amendment protection. 82 Justice Souter, in
his dissent, complained that the rule in Garcetti would deny constitutional protections when "a public auditor speaks on his discovery of embezzlement of public funds, when a building inspector makes an obligatory report of an attempt to bribe him, or when a law enforcement officer
expressly balks at a superior's order to violate constitutional rights he is
sworn to protect., 83 Likewise, legal commentators have argued that Garcetti's chilling effect on future whistle-blowers will ultimately undermine
the public's "right to hold government accountable," and frustrate the
public's ability to uncover waste and corruption.84
Curiously, as rigid and formalistic as the rule in Garcetti seems to
be, it nevertheless leaves much interpretative room for the lower courts.
The Garcetti Court declined to provide a framework for making the critically important determination of when speech is pursuant to official duties. 85 The Court would only say that the inquiry is a "practical one," and
that formal job descriptions may not accurately describe the actual duties
expected of an employee.86 In fashioning its decision, the Court left
broad interpretive power on the table for the lower courts to flesh out.
How the courts conduct this "practical" inquiry can have an enormous,
even dispositive, impact on the outcome of a case. 87
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETS GARCETII
The Tenth Circuit has already begun to provide guidance in this
murky area. 88 Three cases decided since Garcetti each attempted to ar79.
Id.
80.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1966 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting)
82. Id.
83.
Id. at 1966-67.
84.
Sanchez, supra note 2, at 563.
85.
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961.
86. Id. at 1961-62.
87. See generally Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.
2007); Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 2007); Green v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2007).
88.

Cheek v. City of Edwardsville, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1230 (D. Kan. 2007) ("In Garcetti,

the Supreme Court declined to articulate a comprehensive fiamework for determining when a gov-
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ticulate when employees speak pursuant to their official duties. The cases
are Green v. Boardof County Commissioners,89 Casey v. West Las Vegas
Independent School District,9" and Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks
CharterAcademy.9 1
A. Green v. Board of County Commissioners
In January 2007, the Tenth Circuit issued its first interpretation of
Garcetti in the case of Green v. Board of County Commissioners.92 In
Green, plaintiff Jennifer Green was a technician and detention officer
employed in the drug-lab of a juvenile detention center. 93 She became
concerned that a particular drug test was unreliable after an apparent
false positive. 94 On her own initiative, and without her supervisor's permission, she arranged a confirmation test at a local hospital.95 She also
96
informed the Department of Human Services about her suspicions.
When the confirmation test revealed the suspect test was indeed flawed,
Green notified her supervisor.97 As a result, the juvenile detention center
adopted a new policy instituting confirmation testing.98 Shortly thereafter, Green claimed her supervisors retaliated against her. 99 The detention
center transferred her out of the drug-lab and demoted her.' 0 0 When she
failed to show up for work, the center fired her.' 0'
The Tenth Circuit noted in Green that the Garcetti Court did not articulate a framework for determining when an employee's speech is pursuant to official duties. 10 2 Faced with an open question, the appellate
panel in Green interpreted Garcetti to stand for the proposition that
"speech is made pursuant to official duties if it is generally consistent
103
with 'the type of activities [the employee] was paid to do."',
The speech in question had to do with Green's communications
with the manufacturer, state, and the defendant regarding the confirmation test. 30 The court of appeals framed its analysis as an either/or sceernment employee speaks pursuant to his or her official duties. The Tenth Circuit, however, has
provided significant guidance on this issue since Garcetti." (citation omitted)).
89. 472 F.3d 794.
90. 473 F.3d 1323.
91.
492 F.3d 1192.
92.
Green, 472 F.3d 794.
93. Id.at 796.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100.
Id.at 797.
101.

Id.

102.
Id.at 798.
103.
Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007)
(alteration inoriginal) (quoting Green, 472 F.3d at 801).
104.
Green, 472 F.3d at 800.
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nario. Either Green was acting within the scope of her duties because
she was hired to collect samples, conduct drug tests, check equipment,
and communicate with others regarding the testing,'0 5 or she was acting
as a private citizen outside the boundaries of her job as a matter of public
for the reconcern by advocating for better testing policies and arranging
10 6
do.
to
hired
was
she
which
of
none
sample,
test of a suspect
The appellate panel concluded the facts were closer to the Garcetti
scenario than to one involving a private citizen because Green had been
working internally on activities that "stemmed from" the type of duties
she was hired to do.' 0 7 According to the Tenth Circuit, the fact that she
disagreed with her supervisors on the testing policy, and sought an unauthorized confirmation test, confirms she was working within the scope
of her official duties, even if she did not have explicit authority to take
the particular action.10 8 Quoting Garcetti, the appellate court said a
"government employee's First Amendment rights do 'not invest them
'
with a right to perform their jobs however they see fit." 109
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit in Green refined Garcetti's "pursuant to official duties" analysis by asking whether an employee's on-thejob speech is generally consistent with the type of activities the employee
was paid to do." 0 If the answer is yes, then the speech is pursuant to
official duties, and there is no constitutional protection from employer
discipline.
B. Casey v. West Las Vegas Independent School District
Just a few weeks after issuing the ruling in Green, the Tenth Circuit
crafted another decision interpreting Garcetti: Casey v. West Las Vegas
Independent School District.'' In Casey, the court defined the Garcetti
within an employee's
scope of duties broadly, declaring speech that falls
12
"portfolio" to be pursuant to her official duties."
In Casey, the plaintiff was a school district superintendant who
oversaw the district's federally funded Head Start program." 3 Superintendant Casey eventually learned the district may have improperly dis-14
bursed federal monies to families that did not qualify for Head Start.
Fearing the payouts could jeopardize future funding, Ms. Casey notified
school board officials, who told her "not to worry about it.'' 5 Con105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 800-01.
Id. at 801.
Id. (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006)).
Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007).
473 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1329; Brammer-Hoelter,492 F.2d at 1203.
Casey, 473 F.3d at 1325.
Id.at 1326.

115.

Id.
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cerned she had a legal duty to report fiscal improprieties, Ms. Casey ordered an assistant to disclose the findings to Head Start.'" 6 In response,
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services substantiated the
allegations and ultimately sought to recoup over $500,000 from the
school district."17 Several months later the school board demoted Ms.
Casey, and eventually fired her." 18 She sued the district alleging her termination was unconstitutional retaliation against her speech. 119 Defendants asked for summary judgment based on a defense of qualified immunity. 120 After the District Court denied summary judgment, defendants appealed to the Tenth Circuit.'21
The Tenth Circuit began its inquiry by again employing the first
question under the post-Garcetti Connick-Pickering test: Did the plaintiff speak as a private citizen on a matter of public concern? 2 2 The appellate panel applied the rule in Garcetti that government employees who
speak pursuant to their official duties do not speak
as private citizens and
2
thus are not protected from employer discipline. 1
Similar to its analysis in Green, the Tenth Circuit framed the central
question as an either/or proposition. 124 Either Ms. Casey's act of notifying federal Head Start about possible improprieties amounted to a private
citizen engaging in constitutionally protected whistle-blowing, or Ms.
Casey's communication amounted to speech "pursuant"125 to her "official
duties," in which case it would not be protected speech.
The court of appeals reasoned that when Ms. Casey agreed to become superintendent, she assumed an obligation to comply with federal
regulations concerning the Head Start program. 126 The panel also noted
that "with knowledge of financial irregularities [Ms. Casey] risked civil
and criminal liability by remaining silent in the face of such knowledge.' 2 7 Despite the plaintiffs argument that her reports to federal authorities constituted speech by a private citizen, the court found the
speech to be squarely within her "portfolio," and thus pursuant to her
official duties. 128 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit held that her speech
did not qualify for First Amendment protections under Connick-

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id
Id.
ld.at1327.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at1328.
Id.
Id.at1329.
Id.
Id.at1330.
Id
Id.at1329, 1331-32.
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Pickeringas modified by Garcetti.129 Thus, the Garcetti razor settled the
matter before it ever got to a Connick-Pickeringanalysis.
In both Green and Casey, the Tenth Circuit interpreted Garcetti's
"speech pursuant to official duties" bar broadly, denying First Amendment protection for employees' speech that either fell within theirportfolio of duties 30 or was generally consistent with the type of duties they
were hired to do.' 3 ' The court held this to be true even though the employees' speech in both cases arguably amounted to whistle-blowing that
revealed impropriety, mismanagement, and possible fraud involving public tax dollars.
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit could have chosen to interpret Garcetti more narrowly, as some other courts have, 3 2 which would have
allowed the Garcetti razor to cut short the case only where the speech is
requiredby rather than consistent with official duties. Had the appellate
court chosen such an approach in Green and Casey, the plaintiffs' claims
might have survived the Garcetti razor.
C. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy
When the Tenth Circuit took its third swing at Garcetti, it approached the same speech questions somewhat less conservatively than
the previous two cases.' 33 In contrast to Green and Casey, the third postGarcetti case to come out of the Tenth Circuit in 2007 was BrammerHoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy. 134 The court in BrammerHoelter interpreted Garcetti's (speech pursuant to official duties) test
more narrowly, and thus more charitably to free speech rights, than the
previous Tenth Circuit cases. Nevertheless, Brammer-Hoelter remains
35
less deferential to free speech than similar cases from other circuits.
Brammer-Hoelter'skey refinement interprets Garcetti's speech pursuant
to official duties to mean "speech relating to tasks within an employee's
uncontested employment responsibilities.' 36
In Brammer-Hoelter,the plaintiffs, a group of teachers at a charter
school, became concerned about the "operation, management, and mission" of the school. 137 They met at private homes, restaurants, and even
129.
d at 1331.
Id at 1329.
130.
131.
Green v. Bd. of County Conun'rs, 472 F.3d 794, 801 (10th Cir. 2007).
132.
For a discussion of the narrow approach to interpreting Garcetti, see Rhodes, supra note
18, at 1195-96.
This is the author's opinion based on what appears to be a slightly narrower application of
133.
the Garcetti test in Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks CharterAcad., 492 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007),
relative to Green and Casey.
492 F.3d 1192.
134.
See infra Part 1II.A (highlighting cases that interpreted Garcetti's rule narrowly). See
135.
generally Rhodes, supra note 18, at1195-96.
136.
Brammer-Hoelter,492 F.3d at 1203.
Id.at 1199.
137.
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a church to talk about their grievances. 38 Upon learning of the meetings,
the school's principal ordered the teachers not to talk about school issues
outside of work with anyone, including other teachers and staff at the
academy.' 39 Moreover, during a mandatory meeting, the principal advised the teachers not to associate outside of work. 40 In defiance of the
principal's directives, the teachers continued to meet after hours and off
school grounds. 14 1 Eventually, the teachers voiced their grievances to the
school's board of directors. 142 A short time later, the teachers alleged, the
principal gave them poor performance reviews despite later acknowledging that no teacher had violated the school's "policies, codes, or procedures."' 143 The teachers ultimately resigned and brought retaliation
claims alleging the school board had violated their First Amendment
rights. 44
The Tenth Circuit explained that Garcetti has turned the traditional
Pickering analysis of speech retaliation claims into a five step inquiry. 4 5
First, did the employee speak pursuant to her official duties, or as a private citizen? 146 Second, if the employee spoke as a private citizen, was
the speech a matter of public concern? 147 Third, if the citizen's speech
was a matter of public concern, did the employee's speech interest outweigh the government's interest in efficient management? 48 Fourth, if
the employee's speech interest outweighed the government's interest,
was the speech a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action? 149 Fifth, if the plaintiff prevails on the previous factors, can
the government show that it would have taken the same action regardless
of whether the protected speech had occurred? 150 If the answer is yes,
then the inquiry ends and there is no government liability.' 5' Thus, in
order for the plaintiff to have an actionable claim the speech must be
construed: (1) as that of a private citizen speaking on matters of public
concern; (2) whose speech interest outweighs the government's interest;
(3) whose speech was a substantial motivating factor triggering the retaliation; and, (4) but for the speech, the employee would not have suffered the adverse employment action. The high bar set for 52
the plaintiff
means the claim fails entirely if it fails any individual factor.
138.
139.

Id
Id.

140.
141.

Id.
Id.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 1202.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1202-03.
Id.at 1203.
Id.

150.
151.
152.

Id.
See id.at 1202-03.
See id.
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The Tenth Circuit concluded that some of the employees' contested
speech was not made pursuant to official duties.' 53 These instances included speech about "resignations of other teachers ...[restrictions to
teachers'] freedom of speech ... staffing levels ... teacher salaries and
bonuses . ..criticisms of the school board . . . lack of support, trust,
feedback.. . restrictions on speech and association... [and] upcoming
[b]oard elections."'' 5 4 Notably, the Tenth Circuit reached this finding
even though the teachers entered contracts agreeing to "support the philosophy and curriculum of the [school] without reservation,"' 5 5 and even
though the teachers were encouraged to "present their views to improve
the [school]
and did so in the form of complaints and grievances to the
6
Board.q

15

D. Analysis: Brammer-Hoelter, Casey and Green
Brammer-Hoelter's notion of "uncontested employment responsibilities" seems to allow more gray-area speech to survive the Garcetti
razor than Green's "generally consistent with," and Casey's "portfolio"
of duties analysis. For example, in Brammer-Hoelter, the court construed speech about staffing levels, criticism of the school board, and
lack of support, trust and feedback, to be speech that falls outside of "uncontested employment responsibilities" and thus not pursuant to official
duties under Garcetti. 57 The court seemed to reason that if the speech is
arguably outside of the scope of an employee's responsibilities, then it
survives the Garcetti razor and is not considered pursuant to official duties.
The same inquiry using the Green and Casey standards might have
yielded different results. Conceivably, the same speech that passed the
Garcetti hurdle under Brammer-Hoelter, might well have failed under
the previous two cases. Using the broader standards of Green and Casey,
the appellate panel might have otherwise construed speech about staffing
levels, criticisms of the board, and lack of support, trust, and feedback as
being speech "generally consistent" with the "portfolio" of tasks the
teachers were paid to do. That is, those grievances might be generally
consistent with the broader job requirement of providing high quality
education to kids and feedback to superiors. Thus, certain unprotected
speech under Green and Casey might well be protected speech under
Brammer-Hoelter.

153.

Id.at 1204-05.

154.

Id.

155.
156.
157.

Id.at 1204.
Id.
Id.at 1203-05.
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E. Brammer-Hoelter is Still Broader than Garcetti
While Brammer-Hoelterprovides a narrower analysis for excluding
speech from constitutional protection than the previous two Tenth Circuit
cases, it nevertheless remains broader than the specific application used
in Garcetti. The facts of Garcetti involved an employee whose speech
consisted of a written memo that he produced as a requirement of his
job. 5 8 The Court stated, "Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a
responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with a
pending case . . . . 59 A narrow reading of Garcetti might leave the impression that unless the job requires the speech in question, it does not
occur pursuant to official duties.
The Tenth Circuit did not read Garcetti so narrowly. Even Brammer-Hoelter's standard of branding speech unprotected if it relates to
"uncontested employment responsibilities,"' 60 is a broader exclusion of
speech than the narrower reading of Garcetti above. There is plenty of
speech that is not required by a job, but is still nonetheless related to uncontested employment responsibilities. For example, imagine a government employed aviation engineer who is required by his job to report
only design flaws on the projects for which he is directly responsible. If
he notices a systemic problem on a fellow employee's project and takes
it upon himself to report it through the chain of command, he might still
be disciplined under Brammer-Hoelterbecause the report is related to his
uncontested employment responsibilities to produce safe aircraft. On the
other hand, a court interpreting Garcetti narrowly might conclude the
speech was not pursuant to official duties because it was not specifically
required by the job. Thus, there may be cases in which employees suffer
retaliatory discipline for their speech under Brammer-Hoelter whereas
they might otherwise have been protected under a narrower reading of
Garcetti.
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF GARCETIi
The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all read Garcetti's test broadly.16' In each circuit, the appellate panel found speech
occurring within the employment context to be pursuant to official duties
even if the speech was not specifically required by the employer. Such
interpretations arguably expand upon the vague parameters of Garcetti.

158.
159.

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1953 (2006).
Id.at 1960.

160.

Brammer-Hoelter,492 F.3d at 1203.

161.
See Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 2007); Battle v. Bd.
of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11th Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006);
Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2006); see also supra Part II.A-D (ex-

plaining Tenth Circuit cases that broadly interpret Garcetti).
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A. Expansive Interpretationsof Garcetti
In the case of Williams v. Dallas Independent School District,162 an
athletic director was fired after reporting financial improprieties via a
memo to the principal. 63 Even though the employee was not required by
the terms of employment to report the findings, the Fifth Circuit held the
subject of the memo related to the types of things athletic directors deal
with on a daily basis, specifically athletic accounts. 164 The panel concluded the athletic director was not speaking as a concerned citizen but
rather as a government employee pursuant to his 65official duties and was
therefore not entitled to constitutional protection.
Likewise, in Mills v. City of Evansville,166 a police sergeant was disciplined after criticizing a plan by the police chief that would have
moved several officers from crime prevention to patrol. 67 The criticism
occurred after an official meeting, in the presence of other senior supervisors, and concerned the sergeant's prediction that community organizations would resist the proposed change. 168 Despite the sergeant's claim
that she suffered retaliation for speaking on matters of public concern,
the Seventh Circuit concluded the plaintiff was in uniform, speaking as
an employee, on matters of official policy, and thus was not constitutionally protected from discipline.' 69 Thus, even though the employee's
speech was not specifically required by her employment, the appellate
70
panel held her speech was nevertheless pursuant to her official duties. 1
The Ninth Circuit came to a similar post-Garcetticonclusion in the
case of Freitagv. Ayers. 171 In Freitag,a corrections officer complained
to her supervisors about sexual harassment perpetrated by inmates at a
maximum security prison. 172 After her bosses ignored her repeated internal complaints, she wrote letters to state officials, including a state
senator. 173 Her supervisors eventually disciplined her and later terminated her employment. 74 Shortly thereafter, a state investigation corroborated the plaintiffs claims. 75 While the Ninth Circuit held her
communications to state officials were protected under Garcetti, her in76
ternal complaints to supervisors were not constitutionally protected.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

480 F.3d 689.
Id. at 690-91.
Id. at 693-94.
Id. at 694.
452 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 647.
Id.
Id. at 648.
Id.
468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 533-34.
Id. at 533-35.
Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 546.
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The appellate panel reasoned that the plaintiff spoke pursuant to77her official duties when she complained to her immediate supervisors.
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit cases previously discussed approach the
"speech pursuant to official duties" analysis from the same vantage
point. The decisions in Green, Casey, and Brammer-Hoeltereach reveal
a jurisprudential approach that categorizes instances of employee speech
to be pursuant to official duties even1 78if the speech was not specifically
required by the terms of employment.
The common thread tying together the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuit interpretations of Garcetti concerns the question of
whether speech that is required by the job should be distinguished from
speech that is related to the tasks of the job. 179 In Garcetti, the plaintiff
lost his constitutional claim because his speech was specifically required
by his employment.' 80 To wit, Ceballos' memo that caused him to suffer
retaliatory discipline was work product required by the terms of his employment as a prosecutor.18' As an assistant district attorney, he was
required to give his opinion on the merits of a pending case. 82 Contrary
to the unique facts of Ceballos, many of the circuit interpretations discussed in this comment dealt with plaintiffs whose speech was not specifically required by the job. 83 The appellate courts interpreting the
post-Garcetticases broadened the analysis of speech pursuant to official
duties beyond what the Garcetti Court specifically applied. 8 4 Thus, instead of equating speech pursuant to official duties as meaning speech
requiredby official duties, the circuits typically construed speech pursuant to official duties to mean speech that is generally consistent with official duties. As the case holdings indicate, the broader categorization
tends to limit the speech protections for government employees.
B. Narrow Interpretationsof Garcetti
Not all courts have adopted the expansive approach of the Tenth
Circuit. At the federal trial court level, some judges have rejected the
broad interpretations of speech pursuant to official duties in favor of an

177. Id.
178.
Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Green v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794, 801 (10th Cir. 2007)); Casey v. W. Las
Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1329, 1331 (10th Cir. 2007).
179.
For a good discussion on the difference between the broad and narrow interpretations of
Garcetti,see Rhodes, supra note 18, at 1195-97.
180. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
181.

Id.

182.
183.
184.

Id.
See cases cited supra note 161.
Id.
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approach that limits
Garcetti's razor to cases in which the speech is re85
quired by the job.1

For example, in Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Center,186 the
Northern District of Ohio held that Garcetti applies as a limiting factor
only when the employee's speech is required by the job. 187 In Pittman,
an African-American substitute teacher alleged racial discrimination and
retaliation against an Ohio school. 88 One of the contested speech instances involved a memo the substitute teacher had written to the principal about parking issues. 89 Because the memo was related to employment responsibilities but arguably not required by the job, the court concluded Garcetti may not be determinative in barring the claim. 190
Likewise, in Barclay v. Michalsky,' 9' the United States District
Court of Connecticut held that a nurse's retaliation claims, based on her
criticism of the use of "excessive restraints" on psychiatric patients, were
not barred by Garcetti.192 Even though reporting patient health and
safety issues was clearly related to the plaintiffs employment responsibilities, and even though specific work rules required her to file the complaints, the court nevertheless reasoned that her speech did not occur
pursuant to her official duties.' 93 The primary justification for that decision had to do with evidence suggesting the plaintiff did not know she
was specifically required by her employment to file internal reports alleging patient abuse; she merely acted of her own accord. 194 Thus, in
Barclay, the court not only concluded employee speech must have been
required by the job in order for a retaliation claim to be barred under
Garcetti, but the employee must have also been aware of the speech requirement in order for Garcetti'srazor to have impact.' 95
C. Speech Pursuantto Official Duties: All or Nothing
The Tenth Circuit, like the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, has
faithfully followed the Court's guidance in Garcetti that the analysis of

185. Rhodes, supra note 18, at 1195; see also Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Ctr., 451 F.
Supp. 2d 905, 929 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (explaining that "[a]lthough some legal analysts appear to be
interpreting Garcetti as holding that statements made by public employees will never be protected if
the employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment while making the statements, this
Court interprets Garcettimore narrowly." (emphasis added)).
186.
Pittman, 451 F. Supp. 2d 905.
187.
Id. at 929.
188.
Id. at 910, 913-14.
189.
Id. at 929.
190.
Id.
191.
451 F. Supp. 2d 386 (D. Conn. 2006).
192.
Id. at 396.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
See id.
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96
speech pursuant to official duties is an all-or-nothing proposition.
That is, either a government employee's speech is pursuant to official
duties, or the employee is speaking as a private citizen. 197 Nowhere does
the majority in Garcettiaccount for the possibility that an employee may
be speaking both as an employee and as a private citizen on matters of
public concern.1 98 Yet, as Justice Souter argues in his dissent, "a citizen
may well place a very high value on a right to speak on the public issues
199
he decides to make the subject of his work day after day."'

For example, imagine a police department that has an unwritten policy of encouraging officers to use excessive force when arresting political protesters. Also assume that every officer who wants to criticize police policy is required to do so through a superior. Perhaps there is an
officer who disagrees with the excessive force policy not because of his
inability to carry out the policy, but rather because of the policy's potential impact on members of his own family. The officer may fear that his
teenage son, who frequently engages in political protest, might be injured
by police officers who have no disincentive to refrain from using excessive force. The officer might also be concerned that the policy could
impact his neighbors who may be afraid to engage in public political
expression because they fear injury during an arrest.
Assuming the aforementioned circumstances, imagine what would
happen if the officer, while on duty and in uniform, had taken his concerns to his superiors who ultimately fired him in retaliation for his criticism of the policy. While it seems clear the officer in the hypothetical
was speaking as a father, neighbor, and citizen about a policy of which
he had held a unique vantage point because of his employment as a police officer, he would nonetheless be barred from constitutional protection by the Garcetti razor. This is because he was required by his employment to voice his criticisms of department policy through the chain
of command. Because he was in uniform, on duty, speaking about department policy, and following internal procedures required by his employment, he could be construed as both speaking pursuant to his official
duties and speaking as a private citizen on matters of public concern.
Yet the rule in Garcetti and its subsequent interpretations in the Tenth
Circuit and other federal circuits would end the inquiry once the court
determined the speech was pursuant to official duties, even if the officer's primary motivation to speak had come from his perspective as a
private citizen.

196. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007);
Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 2007); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d
528, 545 (9th Cir. 2006); Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 647 (7th Cir. 2006).
197.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
198.
Id.
199.
Id. at 1965 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
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Similarly, in the previously discussed Tenth Circuit case of
Green,2 °° the lab technician's speech to correct problems with the
county's drug testing program might well have arisen both from a desire
to better perform her official duties and to better serve her interests as a
private citizen (on matters of public concern). As a public employee, she
may have been motivated by the desire to achieve more accurate testing
results. Alternatively, as a private citizen, she may have been motivated
by a desire to ensure that the drug testing system treats fellow citizens
fairly. 20 To the extent that job related speech overlaps both domains, the
Garcetti test forces the facts into a false dichotomy. 20 2 In Green, the
Tenth Circuit employed Garcetti's all-or-nothing approach, finding that
the lab technician spoke pursuant to her official duties. 0 3 Thus, even
though she may have had a compelling interest as a private citizen to
speak on matters of public concern, her speech was not protected from
employer retaliation because it was too closely related to her job duties. 204 The predictable and unfortunate consequence of an all-or-nothing
approach is the chilling impact on whistle-blowers whose economic need
for a job may outweigh the desire to correct government improprieties. 205
IV. DIMiNISHED PROTECTION FOR WHISTLE BLOWERS

The Court in Garcetti acknowledged the importance of government
whistle-blowers whose special vantage point makes them particularly
well situated to comment on fraud, corruption, and mismanagement. 206
The majority stated, "[e]xposing government inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance. 20 7 The Court also suggested that governments should be open to "constructive criticism". "as a
matter of good judgment., 20 8 Yet the Court seemed little concerned
about constitutional protections for employees so situated. Instead, the
Court assumed the patchwork of existing state and federal regulations
will provide the appropriate protections. According to the majority, government employees enjoy "the powerful network of legislative enactments-such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor codesavailable to those who seek to expose wrongdoing.', 20 9 Yet, as Justice
Souter vigorously pointed out in his dissent to Garcetti, these legislative
200. Green v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2007).
201.
Id.at 800 ("Under this view, by arranging for the confirmation test ... , Ms. Green was
not doing the job she was hired to do, but was acting outside of her day-to-day job responsibilities
for the public good.").
202.
Sanchez, supra note 2, at 560 (discussing Garcetti'sper se rule and the false dichotomy it
creates between citizen speech and employee speech).
203.
Green, 472 F.3d at 801.
204. Id.at 800-01.
205.
Sanchez, supra note 2, at 563 (discussing the whistle-blower's dilemma in a post-Garcetti
landscape).
206. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006).
207. Id.
208. Id.(quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983)).
209. Id.(citation omitted).
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protections are neither uniform, comprehensive, nor existent in all juris2 t0 In fact,
dictions.
several recent cases have removed any lingering
211
doubt.
For example, in Williams v. Riley,2 12 the state whistle-blower statute
in Mississippi was not broad enough to protect several county police
officers who were fired after reporting to their supervisors that a fellow
officer had physically beaten a "restrained prisoner., 213 After their termination, the officers sued the county sheriff on speech retaliation
claims.214 Because the officers reported the alleged misconduct through
the chain of command as their job duties required, the federal trial court
found the speech to be pursuant to official duties under Garcetti.21 5 Predictably, the claims failed because the Garcetti razor categorically bars
constitutional protection for speech that is pursuant to official duties.
However, even as the court concluded the outcome "impossible to circumvent" in light of Garcetti,the court also expressed deep reservations
about the rule.2 16 In a lamenting opinion, critical of Garcetti, the trial
judge wrote, "[t]his court is gravely troubled by the effect of Garcetti on
a factual scenario such as that before the bar. It allows no federal constitutional recourse for an employee of the State of Mississippi217who is fired
for reporting a fellow government employee's misconduct.,
The lack of whistle-blower protection means fewer government
employees are likely to come forward to provide information of corruption and malfeasance. Legal commentators have criticized Garcetti's
chilling effect on potential whistle-blowers, a development that seems
likely to damage the public's ability to learn of government fraud and
mismanagement.2 t8 Similarly, Garcetti has been accused of undermining
the state's ability to operate efficiently by implicitly encouraging the
219
non-reporting of waste and corruption.
A. The Perverse Incentive
The Supreme Court offered several justifications for its dramatic
roll-back of free speech rights in Garcetti. The Court claimed compel210.

Id.at 1970-71 (Souter, J., dissenting).

211.

See, e.g., Williams v. Riley, 481 F. Supp. 2d 582, 584-85 (N.D. Miss. 2007); see also

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *21, Spiegla v. Hull, No. 07-273, 2007 WL 2461589 (7th Cir. Aug.
27, 2007).

212.
Riley, 481 F. Supp. 2d 582. The state whistle-blower statute would have protected the
officers had they reported the misconduct through a state investigative agency such as the district
attorney rather than through the Sherriff's chain of command. Id. at 585.
213.
Williams v. Riley, No. 2:05CV83-P-B, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46697, at *1-*2 (N.D.
Miss. July 10, 2006).
214. Riley, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 584.
215. Id
216. Id.
217. Id
218.
Sanchez, supra note 2, at 563; see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1967 (2006)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting Justice Souter's criticisms of the majority in Garcetti).
219.
Sanchez, supra note 2, at 563.
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ling separation of powers concerns for not wanting to second guess every
executive branch decision relating to employee discipline. 2 Moreover,
the Court asserted the smooth operation of government depends in part
on the official communications of employees being "accurate, demon221
strat[ing] sound judgment, and promot[ing] the employer's mission.
The majority seemed to imagine a world without Garcetti as being tantamount to rabble rousers on the public payroll using the Constitution as
an excuse to say whatever they want, perform their jobs however they
see fit, and make every disciplinary case a matter of constitutional retaliation. 222
Ironically, the Garcetti rule appears to have created a perverse incentive that encourages government employees to take their problems
first to the media, or any authority outside of the employee's immediate
chain of command.22 3 This is because a government employee who tips
off a newspaper reporter about government corruption is more likely to
have engaged in constitutionally protected speech than the government
employee who reports the same corruption through official government
channels.2 24
For example, if a state prison worker notices a drug dealing scheme
involving several other prison guards, she is not protected from discipline if she reports the behavior through the official chain of command.
This is because her job description likely includes duties such as reporting health, safety, and criminal infractions to her supervisor. Thus, if her
employer fires her for reporting her fellow guards, she would have no
constitutional recourse because her speech was pursuant to her official
duties. However, if that same prison guard instead went straight to the
media to report the drug dealing scheme because she was outraged as a
taxpayer that her government was operating prisons in such a perilous
way, the result might be very different. Her speech is more likely to be
constitutionally protected because she is speaking as a private citizen on
matters of public concern.
Justice Stevens, in his Garcetti dissent, recognized the troubling
possibility that the very same speech that is constitutionally protected in
one context is barred from protection in another context.225 Likewise, in
his lengthy discussion criticizing the majority's opinion, Justice Souter
220.

Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961 (explaining that to allow constitutional protection for job

related speech would "demand permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental
operations to a degree inconsistent with sound principles of federalism and the separation of powers.").
Id.at 1960.
221.
222. Id.at 1959 (explaining that "while the First Amendment invests public employees with
certain rights, it does not empower them to 'constitutionalize the employee grievance."' (quoting
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983))).
Sanchez, supra note 2, at 562.
223.
224. See id.
Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1963 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225.
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said it is "no adequate justification for the suppression of potentially
valuable information simply to recognize that the government has a huge
interest in managing its employees and preventing the2 26occasionally irresponsible one from turning his job into a bully pulpit.
Interestingly, even the majority in Garcetti recognized the possibility of the perverse incentive when it advised public employers to create
internal procedures to encourage employees to share their criticisms privately.22 7 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy said, "Giving employees an internal forum for their speech will discourage them from
the safest avenue of expression is to state their views in pubconcluding
28
lic."

2

B. PracticalImplicationsfor Practitioners
In light of Tenth Circuit trends in the wake of Garcetti,government
employers looking to hedge their advantage may choose to define job
descriptions broadly, including specific directives that employees are to
funnel all complaints and concerns relating to possible fraud, mismanagement, waste, and criminality to appropriate internal channels. While
the Court in Garcetti bristles at the suggestion that employers can limit
the speech rights of employees by simply imposing "excessively broad
job descriptions, 229 a growing body of case law emerging at the trial and
appellate levels seems to suggest the reality on the ground is otherwise. 230 Government employers might also strengthen their position by
mandating employees attend formal training to reinforce the expected
duties.
As for employees, it seems clear the Supreme Court and federal circuits have established a significant burden for the employee to overcome.
One possible way to preserve whistle-blower protections is to bargain for
them contractually. For employees who have leverage, via union or otherwise, insisting on contractual speech protections can help avoid the
default position of having little constitutional protection should a case of
speech retaliation arise. In the event that a case of corruption, criminality, or waste comes up, the employees who cannot bargain for contractual protections are left with a choice to either stay quiet or risk losing
their jobs. Reporting outside the chain of command seems to offer more
possibility for constitutional protection if the matter is one of public concern. However, employers may be able to defeat this potential shield if
226. Id.at 1967 (Souter, J., dissenting).
227. Id.at 1961.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See generally Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007); Battle v.
Board of Regents, 468 F.3d 755 (1 1th Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006);
Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2006); see also supra Part lI.A-D (explaining
Tenth Circuit cases that broadly interpret Garcett0.
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the job description specifically bars employees from going to the media
or elsewhere with speech that is related to the job. Ultimately, whistleblowers have more to lose in a post-Garcettilandscape and less incentive
to be courageous.
CONCLUSION

Garcetti v. Ceballos significantly restricted the First Amendment
protections of government employees. The new rule acts as a razor
against retaliation claims that arise pursuant to official duties. Yet for
such an important change, the Supreme Court left a surprising amount of
discretion to the lower courts to fashion a framework for determining
when speech is pursuant to official duties. Predictably, different courts,
including the Tenth Circuit, have moved in different directions. The
Tenth Circuit, among others, seems to have expanded the specific test
used in Garcetti. The result is a broader analysis of job related speech
acts that ultimately leads to more speech restrictions. The regrettable
impact is the chilling effect on whistle-blowers. As a result, citizens are
now more likely to be deprived of information about government corruption, criminality, and waste.
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